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Fig. S1. Effect of the cost of reputation building, cR, on the evolution of cooperation in a 
situation where the reputation of a donor is built by the recipient instead of a third 
person/observer. The figure format and simulation parameters are the same as those used for Fig. 
1. Black points indicate a case without the cost of reputation building, and green points 
represent a case with the cost, cR (triangles: cR = 0.1; squares: cR = 0.01; these symbols overlap). 
(A) Individuals use the moral assessment rule, SCORING. Top row: the average number of 
rounds for each individual in a generation, m, is 3; Middle row: m = 5; Bottom row: m = 7. (B) 
MILD. (C) STERM. 
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Fig. S2. Effect of the cost of reputation building for second-order observers, cR’, on the 
evolution of cooperation. The figure format and simulation parameters are the same as those 
used for Fig. 1, but the cost for (first-order) observers, cR, is fixed at 0.1. Black points indicate a 
case without the cost for second-order observers (i.e., cR’ = 0), and red points represent a case 
with the cost, cR’ = 0.1. (A) Individuals use the moral assessment rule, SCORING. Top row: the 
average number of rounds for each individual in a generation, m, is 3; Middle row: m = 5; 
Bottom row: m = 7. (B) MILD. (C) STERM. 
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Fig. S3. Evolutionary dynamics in a situation where an observer who does not build the donor’s 
reputation can lose his/her own good reputation. The percentages of cooperation (red solid 
lines), the individuals who build the donor’s reputation when in the role of an observer (i.e., q = 
1; black solid lines) and the individuals who build the observer’s reputation in the role of a 
second-order observer (i.e., r = 1; black dotted lines) in a typical simulation run are plotted as a 
function of generation (benefit of cooperation b = 1; cost of cooperation c = 0.25; population 
size n = 200; the average number of rounds for each individual in a generation m = 5; 
probability of implementation error ε = 0.05; mutation rate µ = 0.01; cost of reputation building, 
cR = cR’ = 0.1; at the first generation an individual's strategy k is determined randomly and q = r 
= 1). Regardless of the moral assessment rules, an individual building reputation in the role of a 
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second-order observer (r = 1) is exploited by individuals with r = 0 because of the cost cR’; then, 
no individual builds the donor’s reputation in the role of a (first-order) observer since the 
reputation-building no longer results in the observer’s good reputation; thus, indirect reciprocity 
never works. (A) Individuals use the moral assessment rule, SCORING. (B) MILD. (C) STERM. 
